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Implementation of the WTO

Agreements: Framework and Reform
Xin Zhang*
1. INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization (WTO) 1 aims to establish an "integrated, more viable and durable" multilateral trading system.2 The WTO
plays a central role in setting the rules necessary for orderly trade liberalization and providing a common institutional framework for the trade-related
conduct of the Members under the WTO Agreements. 3 The four key objectives of the WTO are: (1) to set and enforce rules for international trade; (2)

* L.L.M (London, 2000); Master of Laws (Xiamen, PRC, 1997); PRC-qualified lawyer,
member of the Chinese Bar Association and member of Chinese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. The author is now a Ph.D researcher at the Department of Law, SOAS, University of London. Email: zhangxinlO@hotmail.com. I would like to thank Professor Michael
Palmer for his valuable opinions and comments.
1The WTO came into existence on January 1, 1995, and is formally established by the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. There were 144 Members as of January 1,
2002.
2 Final Act, supra note 1, at pmbl., 4.
3 The WTO Agreements were finalized on December 15, 1993 and took effect on January
1, 1995. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter Agreement Establishing WTO]. The term "WTO Agreements" collectively refers to the Agreement
Establishingthe World Trade Organization,the four Annexes to this Agreement (Annex 1A
contains the MultilateralAgreements on Trade in Goods; Annex I B contains the General
Agreement on Trade in Services; Annex 1C contains the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual PropertyRights; Annex 2 contains the Understandingon the Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; Annex 3 contains the Trade Policy Review Mechanism [hereinafter TPRM]; and Annex 4 contains the Plurilateral Trade Agreements), the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations that accompany the Agreements, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services that accompanies the Agreements. In
this article, the term "WTO Agreements" refers to the components of the WTO Agreements
package on an individual basis.
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to provide a forum to negotiate and monitor trade liberalization; (3) to improve policy transparency; (4) and to resolve trade disputes.4 In particular,
the WTO shall "facilitate the implementation, administration and operation,
and further the objectives" of the WTO Agreements. 5 The realization of
these objectives depends on the completeness, effectiveness and efficiency
of implementing the WTO Agreements, whose legitimacy and credibility
are to a great extent reinforced by the demonstrated success of implementation.
There are two distinct but interactive levels for implementing the WTO
Agreements. First, by the WTO as an international institution that enforces
the implementation mechanisms and methods embedded in the WTO
Agreements. Second, by each Member at its national level through legislative, administrative and judicial actions that entrench the WTO Agreements
into the domestic legal system. This article will focus on the first level, by
exploring the general theories and practices of how the WTO Agreements
design a set of mechanisms, techniques and channels that ensure its implementation at the WTO level.
The term 'implementation' has two meanings in the WTO context.
The general meaning refers to all the modalities, mechanisms, and instruments that assist in the application of the WTO Agreements. A more recent
meaning, highlighted by the Doha Development Agenda, addresses the
'implementation-related issues and concerns' such as those "raised by many
developing-country Members regarding the implementation of some WTO
Agreements and Decisions, including the difficulties and resource constraints that have been encountered in the implementation of obligations in
various areas.",6 In this regard, the WTO implementation issue refers to the
abilities of developing-country Members to implement the existing WTO
Agreements and to benefit more from the multilateral trading system, and
how the WTO and other Members can help them promote such abilities.
The implementation of the WTO Agreements can be analyzed as one
umbrella topic. Generally, there are two targets of implementing a multilateral treaty. The first target is to ensure that all Members have the capacity
to enjoy the treaty rights or benefits and abide by the treaty obligations (for
example, with an effective and honest bureaucracy, economic resources, institutional structures, technical expertise and public support). 7 The second
4 Kym

Anderson, The Future Agenda of the WTO, in

THE WTO SECRETARIAT, FROM
GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 7, 8
(Kluwer Law International, 2000).
5Final Act, supra note 1,at art. 111, 1.
6 WTO Secretariat, Implementation-RelatedIssues and Concerns, pmbl.,
3, Draft Decision of the Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/W/10 (Nov. 14, 2001).
7Kathryn S. Youel, Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, 91 ASIL PROC. 50, 57 (1997).
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target is to ensure that all Members act in compliance with the treaty and refrain from breaching, by the means of surveillance, supervision or sanction.
The first target (the capacity) is always a condition of the second (the compliance). 8 When the Members have no capacity to implement the negotiated WTO obligations, the treaty is noncompliant with the WTO
Agreements. In addition to the implementing capacity, other parallel factors such as the intention, the political context and the economic situation of
one Member will effectively determine the outcome of implementation and
play a more important role in this process. 9 From this perspective, the significance of the Doha Development Agenda is to specify the meaning of
'implementation' to cover the mechanism of capacity building as one precondition of the final success of implementation. The WTO undertakes the
capacity building of developing-country Members (especially the LeastDeveloped Countries, or "LDCs") by delivering technical assistance from
both the WTO and other Members. As the Doha Ministerial Declaration
states:
We attach the utmost importance to the implementation-related issues and concers raised by Members and are determined to find appropriate solutions to
them.... We agree that negotiations on outstanding implementation issues0
shall be an integral part of the -Work Programme we are establishing ....
Part II of this article proposes an analytical framework for the implementation issue of the WTO Agreements by incorporating the modalities,
mechanisms and implementing instruments into an 'implementation matrix.' Part III analyses in detail several core implementing instruments and
comments on their advantages and disadvantages. Part IV discusses the directions of reform to strengthen the implementation of the WTO Agreements. Part V presents a short concluding remark.

8 Another

factor affecting the implementation of international agreements is the signatories' intention to comply, depending on the national leaders and the citizenry's understanding that it is in their self-interest to comply and on their acting on this understanding. The
intention may be presumed by the facts that they negotiate and conclude the agreements.
EDITH BROWN WEISS, STRENGTHENING NATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH TRADE LAW: INSIGHTS

FROM ENVIRONMENT 458 (Marco Bronckers & Reihard Quick eds., 2000).
9 JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 4 (1984).
10WTO Secretariat, Implementation-RelatedIssues and Concerns, Draft Ministerial Dec-

laration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (Nov. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE WTO AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK

A. Modalities of the Implementation Process
The implementation of the WTO Agreements is a process that involves
the interaction among the WTO Agreements, the WTO and its Members,
within different but interrelated functions and modalities. The WTO
Agreements prescribe the sources and forms of implementation in their
texts, providing "the code of conduct and the constitutional framework
within which the code operates."" As an international institution, the WTO
is authorized to employ implementing measures and ensure compliance
with the WTO Agreements by each Member. In this respect, the WTO will
act as an overseer, a supervisor, or an enforcer, as well as a forum to host
trade negotiations or consultations among Members. The WTO Members
are entitled to complain in response to the non-compliance of the WTO
Agreements by other Members, and obliged to observe and implement the
WTO obligations at their national level.
The implementation process can be perceived from different timeframeworks.' 2 They can be categorized into four modalities or functions:
(1) the facilitation of compliance; (2) the assurance of compliance; (3) the
deterrenceof non-compliance; (4) and the correction of non-compliance.

The core of the four modalities is compliance with the WTO Agreements,
the first two concerning the positive aspects of compliance and the latter
two concerning the negative aspects. The positive aspects of compliance
cover the implementing mechanisms that facilitate or encourage the Members to act in line with the WTO obligations. In contrast, the negative aspects of compliance involve the threat or use of implementing mechanisms
that deter the Members from breaching the WTO obligations or enforcing
those obligations to correct such breaches. The collective effect of these
modalities is to increase the degree of Members' compliance with the WTO
Agreements.
There is an inherent logic between the four modalities of the implementation process. The WTO shall invest its resources or channel other
Members' resources to help a Member (mainly a developing-country Member) build up the capacity to implement the WTO Agreements and to participate more actively in the progress of trade liberalization so as to
facilitate the compliance. When the Members have the implementation capacity, the WTO needs to ensure that they are implementing the WTO

11AsIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE NORMS 49-50 (Manchester Univ. Press 1996).
1 d.at 50.
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Agreements in a WTO-consistent way, and performing the WTO obligations in an on-going status at any given time. After Members act in compliance with these guidelines, efforts may be directed at pre-empting the noncompliance with the WTO Agreements in a Member's implementation at an
early stage. Pre-empting at this level will deter the breach of obligations by
setting out the ways that the Members shall perform and subject the sign of
breach to the scrutiny of the WTO and other Members at an early stage.
Finally, when the non-compliance by a Member cannot be solved by diplomatic negotiations between Members, the WTO will provide a correction
function by settling the disputes and enforcing the decisions to remedy the
non-compliance.
B. Mechanisms of Implementing the WTO Agreements
There are four mechanisms employed by the WTO to implement the
WTO Agreements, as generalized from the texts of agreements, the ministerial decisions and the WTO practices: capacity building, monitoring,supervision, and enforcement.
1. Capacity building
The issue of capacity building mainly concerns developing-country
Members (particularly the LDCs). Developing countries constitute the majority of the WTO Members (over 80 percent of the 144 Members as of
January 1, 2002). The functions of the WTO and the multilateral trading
system will be fundamentally undermined if the majority Members cannot
implement the WTO Agreements due to lack of capacity.
The Uruguay Round leading to the establishment of the WTO adopted
a 'single undertaking' approach in the negotiation. 13 This agreement covered 15 negotiating areas and the commitments assumed under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), and each of these areas have
been incorporated into a single legal instrument-the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization-whichmust be accepted in its totality. 4
The key advantage of this approach is to strengthen the rule system by persuading Members to accept less favorable rules in one area if they are compensated by rules allowing higher benefits in other areas. 1 5 Under the
single undertaking, developing countries are presumed to be equipped to
take on obligations similar to industrialized countries which have reached

13

Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in

ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS & LIMITS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORDER 119,

147 (Cameron May ed., 2000).
4 Final Act, supra note 1, at art. XIV,
15Anderson, supra note 4, at 158-59.
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far higher levels of economic development,' 6 but are entitled to enjoy a'
"special and differential treatment" ("S&D treatment"). This treatment for
developing countries covers five headings: lower level of obligations, more
flexible implementation timetables (e.g., certain years of transition period),
commitments by developed countries to take into account developing country interests, more favorable treatment for LDCs, and promises of technical
assistance and training.17 However, most of the 97 provisions in the WTO
Agreements calling for S&D treatment of developing countries are 'best
endeavor' commitments and are not binding on developed countries.18 The
only tangible concession granted to developing countries under most WTO
agreements is a slightly longer time for implementation.
The experiences of implementing the WTO Agreements by developing
countries in the last seven years suggest three types of implementation concerns. The first concern involves the ability of developing countries to implement the large number of WTO Agreements before the transition periods
expire. Implementing these obligations requires the necessary legislative
and administrative capacity, sound legal and institutional infrastructure, financial sources and expertise. Developing countries, especially smaller
countries and LDCs, generally lack the capacity to apply the WTO Agreements fully or participate effectively in the continuous work of the WTO.
The potential result of these deficiencies is not only the breach of their obli9
gations but also the failure to gain the full benefit of WTO membership.'
The second implementation concern is to encourage the developedcountry Members to deliver on their promises and commitments to developing countries under the best-endeavored obligations. 20 Many S&D provisions provide in broad terms that developed countries should help
developing countries in specific areas (such as technology transfer under intellectual property protection) without defining exactly what action is
needed. 2' In practice, developed countries have shown less consideration of
developing country interests than anticipated, especially in those areas of
interest to developing countries (for example, exports of textiles, clothing
KEVIN WATKINS & PENNY FOWLER, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS:
TRADE,
GLOBALISATION, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 235 (2002).
17See generally, e.g., Alice Alexandra Kipel, Special and Differential Treatment
16

for Developing Countries, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 617-94 (Terence

P. Stewart ed., A.B.A., Section of Int'l Law & Practice 1996).
18

BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 392-393 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
19JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND 336 (1995).
20 HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 18, at 398.
21 General Council Approves Work Programme on Implementation Problems of Developing Countries, 46 WTO Focus, May-June 2000, at 3.
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and agricultural products). 2 The developing countries also require more
assistance to improve their capacity to enjoy these benefits, while developed countries were reluctant to transfer
the resources required to either the
23
WTO or the individual country itself.
The third concern is whether and to what extent the substantive rules of
some of the WTO Agreements are compatible with national development
priorities of developing countries. Developing countries expect the multilateral trading system to enable them, within a broad-based system of accepted rules, to implement the policies needed to generate growth and
reduce poverty.24 The WTO had noted as early as 1996 that "some Members have expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects" of the implementation issue.25 The Doha Development Agenda unambiguously recognizes
that the development issue is one major topic, which can be promoted by
"enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted,sustainablyfinanced technicalassistanceand capacity buildingprogrammes"26 (emphasis added).

In reviewing the implementation concerns, it is clear that capacity
building is inherent in the implementation issue. The capacity building re-

lates the ability of developing countries to implement the WTO Agreements
within the allowed period, to observe the WTO obligations on a continuous
basis, to integrate into the world trading system, and to combine the trade
policy with the broader aim of development. The importance of capacity
building has been fully addressed in the Doha Development Agenda, which
states:
We confirm that technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements
of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system, and we welcome and endorse the New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building, Growth and Integration.... The delivery of WTO technical
assistance shall be designed to assist developing and least-developed countries
and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines,
implement obligations and exercise the rights of membership, including draw-

22 See

generally Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 33, 39-51 (Dec. 2000).
23 HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI, supra note 18, at 398-99.
24For example, India expressed that trade should be "an instrument of development, to
raise standards of living, expand production, keeping in view, particularly, the needs of de-

veloping countries and least-developed countries." Ramakrishna Hegde, WTO Issues and
India's Concerns: Speech at the Second Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Geneva (May
18-20, 1998), in INDIA AND THE WTO: A MONTHLY NEWSL. OF THE MINISTRY OF COM., 6
Feb. 1999, availableat http://commerce.nic.in/wtofeb.htm.
25WTO Secretariat, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 10, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec.
18, 1996).
26 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 10, at 2.
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27
ing on the benefits of an open, rule-based multilateral trading system.

This statement from the Doha Development Agenda illustrates the status of
capacity building in the overall implementation issue of developing countries and the purposes of capacity building.
In contrast to the implementation concerns that have been addressed,
two tendencies may exist in the delivering of trade-related capacity building
to developing countries. The first tendency is that it is predictable that the
more efficiently the capacity building is performed, the more demanding
the beneficiaries become. The second tendency is that a more efficient delivery will result in the developing countries playing a more proactive role
in the trade negotiations, which makes the multilateral process more complicated. The first tendency should be balanced with the secure and predictable funding and the priorities of capacity building, taking into account
the factor that there are limited resources for this purpose. The second tendency, although as a strongly practical concern, cannot justify any reluctance to the mechanism of capacity building under the auspice of the WTO.
Arguably, it will contribute to a healthy and highly necessary democracy in
the trade negotiation and facilitate a consensus in the final outcome. The
purpose of the multilateral trade negotiation is to find a win-win solution
for all Members, rather than to technically achieve the agreement in trade
documents by making use of the inexperience of some participants and
damaging the confidence of the trading system in the long run.
2. Monitoring
Monitoring is a mechanism to collect and evaluate information in accordance with a particular standard. In some literature, this mechanism is
also called a 'surveillance' 28 or 'review function.' 29 In essence, monitoring
is a "non-intrusive, almost discreet, information-gathering activity of
'watch' or 'observation,' 30 and may impose a transparency obligation on
the monitored nation. The monitor receives, collects and reviews the information from the monitored nation through the ways and means established in the international agreements. However, the monitoring function
itself does not authorize the monitor to correct the behavior of the moni21 d.T38.
28

Qureshi uses this term to describe the information-collection and review functions of

the WTO and tries to distinguish between the non-intrusive or 'teleological approach' from
the intrusive, more coercive function of supervision. See generally QURESHI, supra note 11,
at 51-61.
29 G.J.H. van Hoof & K. de Vey Mestdagh, Mechanisms of InternationalSupervision,
in
SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN INT'L ECON. ORG. 3, 11 (P. van Dijk ed., Kluwer Law Int'l,

1984).

" QURESHI, supra note 11, at 52.
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tored or require the monitored to act in a specified manner. The corrective
function is usually provided by the mechanisms of supervision and enforcement.
Under the WTO framework, the monitored are the Members, and the
subject of such monitoring can be the trade policies and practices of Members and the progress of implementing the WTO Agreements at the national
level. In addition, the WTO will also monitor the general trends in international trade and policies. The methods to carry out the monitoring function
include the publication of information by Members, the exchange of information between the WTO and a Member or between Members through notification and reporting, and the review of such information (which may
demonstrate the situation of implementation) by the WTO or other Members.
The monitoring mechanism serves several important functions of the
WTO and the multilateral trading system. First, one of the most important
objectives of GATT and WTO is to expand the world production of and
trade in goods and services, by "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations." 3' The collection and exchange of information
concerning restrictions on trade by Members and their trade policies is a vital weapon to monitor the Members' trade policies and practices.32 Without
the complete, updated and accurate information available in various aspects
of international trade policies and practices, there is no chance for the WTO
to understand what happens and bring the situation of one Member under
the spotlight. Second, the WTO can review the behavior of one Member on
the basis of the information provided or collected, and recommend the
Member to act in compliance with the WTO Agreements. Other Members
can also have access to the information obtained through various monitoring channels. From this perspective, the monitoring mechanism significantly reduces the information costs of the WTO and its Members and
makes the most efficient use of such information by acting as a central depositary and access point. Third, the information and the results of review
from the monitoring can trigger other implementation mechanisms such as
supervision or enforcement, especially when the information reveals some
WTO-inconsistent behaviors.
A number of WTO bodies have transparency and information exchange functions. Many committees are set up to oversee the functioning
of specific agreements and review the relevant policies of members at inter-

1

31 Agreement Establishing WTO, supra note 3, at pmbl.,
3.
32 SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN INT'L ECON. ORG., supra note

29, at 68.
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vals varying between three months and two to three years.3 3 There are two
types of monitoring powers. The first type is the observation, collection
and evaluation of information that is generally available or specifically provided by Members under the WTO obligations, without more active a role
than that of an objective observer.34 The second type is the "requesting of
information, invitations to consult or even country visits with permission"
of the Member for one particular issue, in which the monitors play a more
active role as the information collector rather than as passive information
receivers. 35 The effectiveness of the monitoring depends on the adequacy
of the organs in charge of and the procedures in relation to this mechanism. 36 While the procedures are in general sound and workable, the WTO
may lack the manpower and budget to carry out the independent data collection and verification.
3. Supervision
Supervision is a mechanism to oversee the behavior of the supervisee
(similar to monitoring) and requires the supervisee to act in accordance with
a particular standard, either substantively or procedurally. It represents a
kind of intrusive and coercive power of the supervisor to interfere with the
affairs of the supervisee, usually arising form a pronounced hierarchical relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee. 37 An effective supervision mechanism will have the functions of guidance, persuasion, and of
potentially more coercive powers (such as sanctions). The essence is to ensure the supervisee is acting in line with the set principles and rules and
voluntarily correcting the non-compliance, the failure of which may lead to
the informal or formal measures of enforcement. In this regard, supervision
can be viewed as a semi-strong implementation mechanism between monitoring (weak) and enforcement (strong).
The supervision mechanism in the WTO suggests that the Members
have suspended to a considerable extent their sovereignty in a particular
sphere to the WTO. As a general rule, States are reluctant to transfer parts
of their sovereign powers in favor of a more effective international institution. In order to balance the Members' sovereignty concerns and the
33 HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 18, at 64. Discussion of some committees' monitoring functions will be discussed infra.
3 This type of monitoring power falls within the traditional meaning of monitoring.
31 QURESHI, supra note 11, at 57.

36 Van Hoof& de Vey Mestagh, supra note 29, at 35.
31 QURESHI, supra note 11, at 61.
38 See generally John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

157, 157-88 (1997) (debating the issue that the Congress of the United States has a deep
concern and doubt over the loss of the sovereignty to an international organization such as
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WTO's supervisory function, the WTO Agreements focus more on the procedural standards, especially the consultation procedures, for the Members
to follow before or after certain actions, rather than expanding the substantive rules (such as prior consent from the WTO, which is rare in the WTO
Agreements). The consultation procedures do not guarantee a certain outcome, but only provide a forum for negotiation between Members. This
approach avoids the Members' viewing the WTO as a far-reaching intrusion into their sovereignty.
4. Enforcement

Enforcement is a mechanism to force compliance with a particular
standard through informal or formal procedures of dispute settlement and
decisions implementation, which "implies compulsion to obedience. 3 9 It
has the strongest sense of coercion, immediacy and particularity among four
implementation mechanisms. Dispute settlement procedures constitute the
core element of this mechanism, serving to adjudicate disputes between the
Members, to recognize violations by the Members, and to force the offending Members to act in line with the agreed upon rules through efficient
sanctions.
The WTO is a rule-oriented system. 40 The degree of its implementation, to a great extent, relies on the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism. If the WTO Agreements lack the coercive mechanisms to police the
Members' behavior and correct non-compliance, the whole system will be
fundamentally flawed. It is suggested that the success of the WTO is
largely determined by the fact that it has changed the 'toothless' feature of
the former GATT system. Under the GATT, the dispute settlement system
was subject to substantial time delays through actions of the parties, and the
losing party could block the adoption of panel reports under the consensus
rule of the Contracting Parties, rendering the process uncertain even for the
winners. 4 1 As a result, GATT dispute settlement was more like a kind of
trade diplomacy or quasi-adjudicative process. The panels could refrain
from being overly assertive for the purpose of avoiding an adverse reaction
the WTO).
39See QURESHI, supra note 11, at 51-53. In this context, the term 'enforcement' is used
in its narrower literal meaning. Some scholars argue that this term can have a wider meaning to include non-coercive measures designed to induce adherence to norms by the state (for
example, the transparency obligations). In this regard, they actually expand the meaning of
'enforcement' to cover all means of implementation.
40 For the classical description of the 'rule-oriented' system and the 'power-oriented' system, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109-111 (MIT Press 1997).
41For a detailed review of the GATT dispute settlement system, see ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL

SYSTEM (Butterworth Legal Pub. 1993).
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from the losing party, which had the power to block the report's adoption.42
In contrast, the WTO substantially promotes the adjudicative nature of its
disputes settlement system, as well as the prospects of implementation.
The Understandingon the Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes (the Disputes Settlement Understanding, or DSU) rectifies the most egregious problems that plagued the GATT dispute settlement
system in four respects, namely, delays, blockage, compliance, and remedial action. 43 The last two aspects are central to the enforcement mechanism and mainly concerned with the implementation of the DSB
recommendations and rulings by Members, so they will be thoroughly discussed in Part III. The first two aspects that contribute to the increased effectiveness of DSU will be briefly outlined here. First of all, the DSU
establishes fixed time periods for every stage of the dispute resolution process. The primary goal of the DSU is the 'prompt settlement' of the disputes
to secure positive solutions between the complaining Member ("the complaining party") and the offending Member ("the respondent"). 44 Accordingly, disputes among WTO Members are resolved under a relatively swift
and predictable timetable, generally within one year for the adoption of the
panel or appellate report and within two and a half years for the retaliation
action. Second, a single Member such as the losing party cannot block the
adoption by the DSB of a panel or appellate report under the DSU. In accordance with the 'negative consensus' rule, there must be a consensus of
WTO Members (including the winning party) not to adopt such a report,
where 'consensus' means that no Member offers a formal objection.45
Likewise, it is no longer possible for a single Member to block the creation
of a panel to hear a dispute. 46 This feature greatly improves the predictability and credibility of the WTO enforcement mechanism.
In essence, the DSU requires all WTO Members to submit disputes to
its jurisdiction and abide by the DSU rules and procedures, thus strengthening the enforcement of the WTO. 47 Any Member cannot unilaterally judge
the violation of the WTO Agreements by one Member and then adopt the
retaliation measures without recourse to the DSU procedure.4 8 On the other
42Christopher Thomas, Litigation Process under the GA TT Dispute Settlement System:
Lessonsfor the World Trade Organization?,30 J. WORLD TRADE 57 (1996).
43 Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on UnilateralAction in the World Trading System, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 159, 164-165 (1997).
44 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33
I.L.M. 1226, art. 3.3 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter DSU].

45 Id. at art. 2.4, 2.4 n.I, 16.4, 17.14. Theoretically it is still possible not to adopt a report
if all Members agree not to do so, including the winning party (which may be for political
reasons).
46
Id., at art. 6.1.
41
Id., at art. 23.1.

48 Id., at art. 23.2.
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hand, the winning party can expect the availability of sanction measures in
the end, even if it is after a period of two to three years of dispute resolution.
C. Implementing Instruments
Implementing instruments are the ways and means used by the different implementing mechanisms, under different modalities, to effectuate the
functions of international agreements. 49 The WTO Agreements design the
following categories of implementing instruments: technical assistance,
transparency measures, supervisory measures, and dispute resolution and
implementation. It is notable that one instrument may be employed by different mechanisms and play a similar or different role in that particular context.
1. Technical assistance

The WTO defines the objectives of technical assistance and cooperation as "to improve knowledge of multilateral trade rules and WTO working
procedures and negotiations" and "to assist in the implementation of commitments in the multilateral trading system and full use of its provisions, including the effective use of the dispute settlement mechanism. ' 5° These
works will be administered by the Secretariat and reviewed by the Members. The Committee on Trade and Development will approve a three-year
plan adjusted on an annual basis, including the budget consideration, and
submit the plan to relevant WTO bodies for implementation. The Secretariat is responsible for organizing and overseeing the implementation of
the plan, by preparing an annual report, a financial report and an ad hoc
status report on the implementation programs. The Committee will evaluate the results of technical assistance activities in order to ensure optimum
use of resources on an annual basis.51
The technical assistance follows the framework of a multi-year programme for beneficiaries (i.e., developing countries, LDCs and transition
economies, etc.). The broad objectives at the country level are first, to provide general information on the multilateral trading system, and second, to
improve the country's participation in this system through training on negotiating techniques, the use of the Integrated Date Base, and dispute settlement courses. The next objective is to deepen beneficiary countries'
knowledge of the trading system through specialized workshops/seminars
and the training of trainers activities. Last but not least is the domestic im49 Van Hoof & de Vey Mestdagh, supra note 29, at 20-21.
50 WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Guidelinesfor WTO Technical Cooperation,

1, WT/COMTD/8 (Oct. 16, 1996).

"' Id. 2.4.
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plementation of multilateral trade agreements. This involves the legislative
process, notifications, and institutional development, as well as specific
training on the domestic operations of certain agreements. 52
The WTO organizes a variety of technical assistance activities, both in
Geneva and in the regions. Technical assistance is mainly delivered in the
following forms: courses, seminars, workshops and technical missions covering a range of subjects, briefings sessions, Reference Centres, and daily
advice to delegations. Examples include the Short Trade Policy Courses,
the Dispute Settlement Workshops and Courses, Trade Negotiation Simulations, and the establishment of WTO Reference Centres. In addition, an
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) was established after the 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference to provide legal assistance to developingcountry Members involved in dispute settlement, whose activities are financed partly by donor countries and cost-sharing by assisted countries.
The WTO will cooperate with other international organizations (e.g.,
World Bank, IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP) to deliver technical assistance
in a coherent policy framework, with relation to the trade-related technical
assistance to LDCs, under an integrated framework. The WTO also works
together with donor countries or regional organizations to jointly engage in
these activities, either as a co-operator or as a channel.53 Following the
Doha Ministerial Declaration's instructions to develop a plan ensuring longterm funding for WTO technical assistance, the General Council adopted on
December 20 2001, a new budget that would increase technical assistance
funding by 80% and establish a Doha Development Agenda Global Trust
Fund with a proposed core budget of 15 million Swiss francs.
2. Transparencymeasures
Transparency measures are related to all implementation mechanisms
and serve as the basic implementing instrument, but have a particular relevance to the monitoring mechanism. Transparency at the WTO and at national levels is essential to reduce uncertainty and enforce the agreements.5 4
The measures include publication, notification, and review. Notification
and review will be analyzed in Part III.
The WTO Agreements impose an obligation of publication on Members in three aspects. The primary obligation is to publish trade-related
laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings with general

52 WTO Committee on Trade and Development, WTO Programmefor Technical Assistance: Three-Year Plan (2001-2003), WT/COMTD/W/84 (May 11, 2001).
53 For example, the WTO announced its cooperation with Arab Monetary Fund (May 3,
2002) and Asian Development Bank (May 9, 2002), respectively, for delivering technical

assistance to Arabian countries and Asian and Pacific countries.
54 HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI, supra note 18, at 61.
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applicability, in a prompt manner.5 5 The General Agreement on Trades in
Services further limits such a publication to be at the least by the time of
their entry into force. 56 The publication obligation also extends to the subsequent changes of these trade legislation and measures. Second, the Members are required to publish more specific information about the trade
regulatory measures, especially for certain non-tariff barriers. For example,
in relation to agricultural or fisheries products, a Member shall give advance public notice of quantitative restrictions that are imposed to enforce
governmental measures controlling the quantity of like domestic products
marketed or produced within the country, 57 with the details of quotas
fixed. 58 For import licensing, publication must normally be at least twentyone days prior to the licensing requirements being made effective; for nonautomatic licenses, the publication of the licensing conditions must include
sufficient information for the traders and Members concerned to understand
the basis of the grant of the license.59 Thirdly, the Members are required to
establish enquiry points that can act as the information center and the access
point for queries. Examples include the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade ("TBT")60 and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryMeasures ("SPM"). 6 1 Similarly, GATS also requires Members to establish enquiry points to facilitate the dissemination of information to other Members, and developed-country Members shall establish
contact points to facilitate access to information of their markets for service
suppliers from developing countries.6 z
Third, there are more onerous requirements of publication in the TBT
and SPM. Under the TBT, the Members are required to publish a notice on
the proposed regulation. The notice must indicate the objective of the regulation and its rationale and the deviation from international standards, if

55 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. X, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (Sep. 1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; General Agreement on Trades in Services, art. III, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1170
[hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, art. 63, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
56GATS, supra note 55, at art. 111:1.
57 GATT 1994, supra note 55, at art. XI.
58 Id. at art. XIII:3(b).
59 GATT, supra note 55, at art. III, Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs
e/legale/23-1ic.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
60
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Mar. 1980, art. 10, B.I.S.D. § 265/8-32,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2003) [hereinafter TBTAgreement].
61Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex B, 1 3,
at hap:// www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/i 5-sps.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter SPMAgreement].
62GATS, supra note 55, at art. IV.
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any, and allow time for the issuing authority to take into account of comments of other Members.6 3 Under the SPM, except in urgent circumstances,
the Members shall allow a reasonable interval between the publication of a
regulation and its entry into force64in order to allow time for interested exporters to adapt to the standards.
The opportunity for public comment will provide a chance for other
Members and affected traders to take part in the decision process and
somewhat influence the outcome. The OECD regards this public notice and
comment procedure as a key element of the prior consultation procedure,
enhancing the efficiency of regulatory measures, and observing a tendency
toward prior consultations in countries.65 It evaluates the function of this
procedure as:
[P]rior consultation should be seen as an opportunity for regulatory authorities
to gather information to feed into their consideration, inter alia, of whether
measures are unnecessarily trade restrictive, rather than as a formal process for
foreign parties to resolve issues directly with regulatory authorities. Foreign
parties' comment could be helpful for estimating the trade impact of proposed
measures and illuminating relative trade restrictiveness of different alternatives. They may thus constitute an early warning system
66 for trade disputes that
may arise with respect to new or modified regulations.
3. Supervisory measures

The WTO undertakes the supervisory function through the following
measures:
*

63

Mandatory requirements of transparency;
Request by the WT0 6 7 or by other Members6 8 on one

TBTAgreement, supra note 60, at art. 2, 5.

64 SPMAgreement, supra note 61,
65

Other
Analysis, 13
66
Id. at 32.
67

2.

OECD, Trade and Regulatory Reform: Insightsfrom the OECD Country Reviews and
WORLD TRADE

&ARB.

MATERIALS

31-32 (Apr. 2001).

For example, under Article VIII of GATT 1994, the WTO Council can request a Mem-

ber to review the operation of its laws in relation to fees and formalities of international
trade. Generally, each WTO Committee in charge of specific trade or trade-related areas has
the right to seek information from all sources, in particular by request of the Members subject to review.
68 For example, Article VIII of GATT 1994 allows a Member to request other Members
to review its laws in relation to fees and formalities of international trade, Article XII allows
one Member to request the information of the administration of import licenses by other
Members, and Article XVII (state trading) allows one Member to request other Members to
supply information on the prices of products when a state enterprise operates as an import
monopoly; Article 5 of SPM allows a Member to request other Members to explain the reasons of SPMs that deviate from international standards; Article 2 of TBT allows a Member
to request other Members to explain the justification of a technical regulation that has sig-
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Member for the provision of information or the explanation

of specific issues;
"

Consultation procedures between the Members or between
the WTO and one Member (including the prior consultations); 69

*

*
*

Reporting to the WTO; tM
Examination by the WTO (including advice and recommendations from the WTO); 71 and
Prior approval from the WTO for certain behaviors.72

The sequence of these measures represents an increase of the coercive factor, in which the transparency requirements (e.g., publication of laws or notification to the WTO of certain actions) are in one polar and the prior
consent are in the other polar. Nevertheless, the obligation of one Member
to consult or negotiate with other Members or to obtain approval from the
nificant impact on trade; Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
requires the Members to accord sympathetic consideration to requests for information on any
matters arising from this Agreement by other Members; under Article VIII of GATS, a
Member may request the WTO Council for Trade in Services to obtain information concerning the operation of a monopoly supplier of a service in another Member.
69 See Part III infra for details.
70 For example, Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures [hereinafter SCM Agreement] requires the Members to report without delay to the
Committee on SCM all preliminary or final actions of countervailing duties; Article 16 of the
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 ("Agreement on Antidumping") requires the Members to report on a semi-annual basis anti-dumping actions in the preceding six months to the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices.
71 For example, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Agreement on Customs Valuation") establishes the Technical Committee on Customs Valuation, which may examine specific problems in the
administration of customs valuation by Members and advice accordingly (Article 18 and
Annex II). The Agreement on Rules of Origin authorizes the Committee on Rules of Origin
to examine and advise on matters arising from the daily administration of rules of origin in
Members. Article 12 of SPM requires the Committee on SPM, upon the initiative of a Member, to invite a relevant international organization to examine the explanations given by a
Member for the non-use of the recommended international standards. Article 26 of SCM allows the Committee on SCM to examine notifications and reports about countervailing duties from Members. Article 9 entitles the Committee to recommend the modification of the
subsidy program or authorize countermeasures in relation to a non-actionable subsidy of the
subsidizing Member. Article XVIllI:12 and Article XII of GATT 1994 requires the Council
to advise on the modification or recommend the conformity with a specified period if the
balance-of-payment restrictions by a Member are inconsistent with GATT articles and damage to the trade of another Member occurs.
72 For example, Article 14 of the Agreement on Antidumping requires the importing
Member to obtain the approval from the WTO Council for Trade in Goods before starting an
anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country; Article XVIII Section D of GATT 1994
requires a Member to obtain the approval of the WTO before imposing restrictions on balance-of-payment to promote a particular industry for the development purpose, and Section
A requires a developing Member to obtain the WTO approval before withdrawal or modification of a concession in order to promote a particular industry if there is no fruitful negotiation with the affected Members.
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WTO before applying a trade policy will be inevitably viewed as an erosion
of the national sovereignty and regulatory autonomy in the economic
sphere. Although these are strongly effective supervisory measures, the
WTO Agreements only authorize their use in very extreme circumstances,
the importance of which justify such a degree of interference. Therefore,
the consultation procedures, and other procedures connected with the request of consultation, are the main supervisory measures.
4. Dispute resolution and implementation
A thorough discussion of the dispute settlement system is beyond the
scope of this article, but the stages of compliance and implementation of the
recommendations and rulings in a panel or Appellate Body report (collectively referred as "the final report") that are adopted by the DSB ("the DSB
recommendations and rulings") are the most significant to the enforcement
mechanism. Usually, the DSB recommendations and rulings are that the
losing party shall withdraw its WTO-inconsistent measures or bring such
measures in compliance with the WTO Agreements. There are three implementing instruments in this respect: the DSB recommendations and rulings to withdraw inconsistent measures by the losing party, compensation,
and retaliation. Part III will give a comprehensive analysis to this category.
D. An Analytical Framework: the Implementation Matrix
The combination of implementing instruments, categorized under the
four mechanisms of implementation, is employed to serve the functions of
different implementation modalities. If we use the modalities as the vertical
axis and the mechanisms as the horizontal axis, we can establish a framework to analyze the policy choices of implementing the WTO Agreements.
Part IV will use this matrix to suggest the future directions of reform, as it
reveals in which aspects the implementation would be strong (so to maintain and balance) or weak (so to strengthen and improve).
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TABLE 1: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS: AT THE WTO

LEVEL
MECHANISMS

Capacity
Building
Facilitate

- Technical
assistance

Monitoring

Supervision

- Report
- Review

- Review

- Publication
- Notification
- Review

- Consultation
- Reporting
- Examination

Enforcement

Compliance
Ensure
Compliance

- Requests

Deter Noncompliance

- Notification
- Review

- Prior approval
by WTO
- Advice by

WTO
- Consultation
- Consultation

Correct
Non-

- Recommendation by WTO

compliance

- Recommendation

and rulings by
DSB
- Sanctions

III. ANALYZING CORE IMPLEMENTING INSTRUMENTS

Four core instruments - notification, review, consultation, and implementation of the DSB rulings and recommendations - constitute the backbones of the implementation framework of the WTO Agreements. They are
applied in various implementation modalities and mechanisms.
A. Notification
1. The WTO requirements

Notification is the basic implementing instrument to obtain necessary
information from one Member. It enables the WTO and other Members to
evaluate the status of compliance, supervise the implementation of the
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WTO Agreements at the national level, and initiate further supervisory and
enforcing mechanisms. It shows how Members are fulfilling their commitments under the WTO Agreements. Further, the increased emphasis on
notification requirements will assist Members in bringing complaints, and
act as a deterrent to those that might otherwise hope to break the rules unobserved.73
The GATT system had over a dozen provisions requiring Member notification of their trade measures. Dissatisfaction with the implementation
of these requirements led to the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, under which the
Members undertook to notify in advance, or failing this, promptly afterwards, their adoption of trade measures affecting the operation of GATT, to
the maximum extent possible.74
The WTO Agreements strengthen the notification requirements on
Members, and expand the scope of notification to all covered areas. There
are over 200 notification requirements contained in various WTO Agreements, or mandated by Ministerial and Council decisions. In 1995, the
General Council adopted a Decision on Notification for the improvement
and review of notification procedures. The decision contained an Indicative
List of notifiable measures, including:
"

Tariffs (including range and scope of bindings, GSP provisions,
rates applied to Members of free-trade areas/customs unions,
other preferences);
* Tariff quotas and surcharges;
" Quantitative restrictions, including voluntary export restraints
and orderly marketing arrangements affecting imports;
" Other non-tariff measures (such as licensing and mixing requirements and variable levies);
" Customs valuation;
* Rules of origin;
" Government procurement;
" Technical barriers;
" Safeguard actions;
" Anti-dumping actions;
* Countervailing actions;
" Export taxes;
* Export subsidies, tax exemptions and concessionary export financing;
" Free-trade zones (including in-bond manufacturing);
" Export restrictions (including voluntary export restraints and

73 EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES

AND74THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Id. at

2.4 1.

2.12 (Globefleld Press 1996) (1986).
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"
*
*
"

orderly marketing arrangements);
Other government assistance (including subsidies, tax exemptions);
Role of state-trading enterprises;
Foreign exchange controls related to imports and exports;
Government-mandated countertrade; and any other measure
covered by the Multilateral
Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to
75
the WTO Agreement.

It also established a Central Registry of Notifications in the Secretariat,
which operates in parallel with existing systems (e.g., notification requirements to specific committees) and records the details of the measure's purpose and trade coverage, and the relevant notification requirement.
Members will be given an annual list of their regular notification requirements, and be informed of their unfulfilled requirements.
In addition, a Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures was established to review notification requirements under the WTO
Agreements on trade in goods, with a view to simplifying, standardizing
and consolidating them and improving compliance. The working group's
1996 report introduced a number of reforms, including the production of a
six-monthly comprehensive listing of notification obligations, and compliance herewith. 76 The Secretariat has published a series of handbooks on notification requirements for the benefit of developing countries.7 7 In 1998,
the notification obligations under GATT 1947 relating to import licensing
procedures were eliminated upon the recommendation of the working
group.
2. Types

There are two types of notification obligations: first, the Members must
provide a consolidated notification, including all changes in laws, regula78
tions, policy statements or public notices, to the Secretariat each year;
second, the Members must satisfy the notification obligation for specific
75 Decision on Notification Procedures,Annex, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs e/legal e/33-dnotf.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
76-Report of the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures, G/L/I 12
(1996), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
77 The handbooks were published in the series WTiTC/NOTIF/.
78 This consolidated notification obligation originated as early as 1964. In that year, the
Contracting Parties (as one institutional body) of GATT adopted a resolution in which they
recommended that each Contracting Party (as the members of GATT) forward promptly to
the Secretariat copies of the laws, regulations, decisions, rulings and agreements of the kind
described in paragraph I of Article X of GATT 1947 (on publication and administration of
trade regulations), together with such other information they consider relevant to the objectives of this recommendation. Recommendation of Mar. 20, 1964, BISC, 1 2th Supplement,
pp. 49-50.
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trade-related measures, whether on a regular/periodic (i.e., semi-annual, annual, biannual or triennial) or a one-off basis, under various WTO agreements, as applicable. For example, the working group identified 175
notification requirements in the WTO Agreements, of which 26 were of a
regular or periodic character and the remainder were ad hoc or one-timeonly requirements. The Listing of Notification Obligations has been revised and updated in an on-going manner, the latest version being released
on June 5, 2002. 79 This Listing gives the details of the notification requirements in the WTO Agreements.
It is necessary to bear in mind that notifications are without prejudice
to views on the consistency of the measures with, or their relevance to,
rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements. ° They are simply the
provision of required information. Moreover, the notification requirements
per se do not appear to be accompanied by penalties for non-compliance. 8'
It seems that the failure of one Member to satisfy the notification obligations itself would not entitle other Members to initiate the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
While the importance of notification as a basic implementing instrument is fully appreciated, it has been the heavy burden of almost all Members to meet the widespread notification requirements.8 2 This problem is
particularly prominent in relation to smaller developing countries and
LDCs, which are most ill-equipped to handle the essential duty of informing the WTO and other Members about their trade policy and practice. Due
to the heavy burden and the lack of capacity, many Members cannot make
notifications on time, nor ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the matters
notified. Since the WTO only acts as a central depositary or a channel for
information sharing, it plays no role in verifying or evaluating the reliability
of the notification. From this perspective, the notification obligations on
Members are more of a procedural issue.
B. Review
Review is a typical power of international organizations and is exer83
cised to judge the behavior of States against a rule of international law.
Reviews by the WTO or its bodies can oversee and evaluate the Members'
status in implementing the WTO Agreements (that is, a monitoring role to
79 The WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Updating of the Listing of Notification Obligations and the Compliance therewith as Set Out in Annex of the Report of the Working Group
on Notification Obligations and Procedures, G/L/223/Rev.8 (June 5, 2002), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.
0 Decision on Notification Procedures,supra note 75, at 1.

8' QuREsHI, supra note 11, at 95.
82 CROOME,

supra note 19, at 335.

83 Van Hoof& de Vey Mestdagh, supra note 29, at 11.
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ensure the compliance). The results of review can highlight the existing
problems of the Members subject to review, and thus may induce the Members to act in line with the recommendations or advice (a supervisory role in
preventing or correcting the non-compliance). Other Members may also
initiate the consultations or even the dispute settlement procedure for WTOinconsistent measures, based on the information revealed through the reviews.
There are three types of review in the WTO system: first, reviews by
specified WTO bodies for their designated trade-related areas, on a regular
or periodic basis; second, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism established
by the WTO Agreements as a comprehensive review of the Members' trade
policies and practice; third, the comprehensive, special annual review as
applicable to the People's Republic of China ("China"), titled as 'Transitional Review Mechanism.'
1. Committee reviews

One of the main tasks of WTO committees is to review and evaluate
the information from the Members. Members are obliged to provide information (through notification or reporting) in specified trade areas to the
committee in charge. The regular reviews serve the essential purpose of establishing a common understanding of how the paper commitments in the
WTO Agreements are being carried out by Members and to what extent
they are implemented in practice. When the responsible committee finds an
inconsistency, it can recommend corrective action. Further, when the results of reviews are circulated among all Members, the Member about
which there is concern is brought under immediate strong pressure to come
into line with the agreements and refrain from going too far on its freedom
to set national trade policies.8 4
The committee reviews prescribed in the WTO Agreements can be
classified as on-going reviews and regular/periodic reviews. Under the ongoing review process, the responsible committee may review and examine
Members' specific problems, and dispense advice or observations. This is a
general task of WTO bodies, which are responsible to review the information upon Members' notification, examine and advise on specific problems
from the Members, study the relevant trade areas and prepare reports. Besides acting as a passive information receiver, in the context of customs
valuation, subsidies and antidumping, the relevant committees have the
power to seek information from within the a Member's jurisdiction, with
the consent of that Member. In TRIPs, this requirement of consent seems to
be absent.8 5 Undoubtedly, the committees with the positive informationsupra note 19, at 334.
supra note 55, at art. 68.

84 CROOME,

85 TRIPS,
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seeking powers can discharge their monitoring and supervision functions in
a more effective way.
Under the regular/periodic review process, the WTO or its responsible
bodies will review the implementation and operation of the relevant WTO
Agreements, which will cover not only the whole scenario of a particular
agreement but also the implementation issues met by Members. There are
three types of regularity in general: annual review,86 biannual review,87 and
triennial review. 88 The results of review may reveal ambiguities in the
agreement texts that need to be solved, possibly by seeking understandings
on how the language concerned should be interpreted.
2. Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM")
TPRM is the successor to a GATT arrangement of the same name created in 1989. The creation of this mechanism was largely caused by the increasing recognition among Members of the inherent value of domestic
transparency of government decision-making on trade policy. A trade policy review is supposed to be an objective observation against "the background of the wider economic and developmental needs, policies and
objectives of the Member concerned."8 9 The TPRM has been a standing
general monitoring device that scrutinizes, catalogues and discusses each
contracting Member's trade policies as a whole since 1989. The purpose of
TPRM is to:
[C]ontribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in,
and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation and
evaluation of the full range of individual Members' trade policies and practices
and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. 90

86 For example, see the Agreement on Rules of Origin (art. 6.1, by the Committee on
Rules of Origin), the Agreement on Antidumping (art. 16.1, by the Committee on AntiDumping Practices), and the Agreement on Safeguards (art. 13.1(a), by the Committee on
Safeguards).
8 For example, see the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (art. 6, by the Ministerial
Conference, two years after the establishment of WTO and every three years thereafter), the
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (art. 7.1, by the Committee on Import Licensing), and TRIPs (art. 71.1, by the Council for TRIPs).
88 For example, see SPM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 12.7, by the Committee on
SPM, and SCMAgreement, supranote 70, at art. 26.1, by the Committee on SCM.
89 TPRM, supra note 3, at A(ii).
90Id. at A(i).
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However, TPRM is not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of
specific obligations under the WTO Agreements, for dispute settlement
procedures, or to improve new policy commitments on Members that
should otherwise be done through the multilateral negotiation. 91 The Trade
Policy Review Body ("TPRB") assumes the task of operating this mechanism.
Therefore, TPRM has two basic tasks: first, to examine the impact of a
Member's trade polices and practices on the multilateral trading system;
and second, to increase the transparency of Members' trade policies and
practices and the relevant decision-making process, thus contributing directly to the monitoring function and indirectly to the supervisory function
of the WTO. 92 Although it is not an enforcement mechanism itse/f through
which specific WTO obligations are enforced in a legal sense, it facilitates
the enforcement in the sense that information revealed in a TPRM may be
used by Members as a basis for enforcement. 93 Furthermore, the review
process, which involves questioning and criticism by TPRB and other
Members, may also be a pressure or a public shame on that Member to correct the WTO-inconsistent trade policies and practices.
The frequency of review depends on one Member's share of world
trade. The four Members with the greatest shares (presently Canada, the
EC, Japan and the U.S.) are reviewed every two years, the next 16 every
four years, and all others every six years (longer periods may be set for the
LDCs). 94 From 1989 to the end of 2001, 150 reviews were carried out in
total, and 74 out of 130 Members have been subject to reviews (counting
the EU as one Member). TPRB has conducted 15 reviews in the year 2001
and plans 17 reviews in 2002.95
The operation of TPRM is summarized as follows. For the purpose of
review, two reports are prepared, one is the Country Report (by the particular country under review) and the other is the Secretariat Report (by the
Trade Policies Review Division of the Secretariat). The Country Report
will describe the trade policies and practices pursued by the Member, based
on the prescribed format. The Secretariat Report will provide a review on
its own account. It is based on the information from the Member under review, through some questionnaires or a visit to the capital of the Member to
gather information. The Secretariat Report normally contains six chapters
and a summary of observations.96 After the completion of the Reports, a

91Id.
92

1d. at

A, B.
supra note 11, at 494.
94 TPRM, supra note 3, at I C(ii).
95 Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2001, WT/TPR/101, (Sept. 18, 2001).
96 See id The chapters deal with the following topics: the economic environment; the
trade policy regime, framework and objectives; trade-related aspects of the foreign exchange
" QURESHI,
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review meeting will be held, usually two days per Member. During the
meeting, it is usual for some Members to actively participate in the meeting
and comment on the trade policies of the Member under review or criticize
inconsistent matters. The Member under review will have a chance to reply
to other Members' comments or criticism and explain its positions. The
minutes of the review
Country and Secretariat Reports, together with the 97
meeting, shall be published promptly after review.
3. Special annualreview
The Protocol on the Accession of China ("the Accession Protocol")
sets up a 'transitional review mechanism' under Article 18. It requires the
subsidiary bodies 98 of the WTO which have a mandate covering China's
commitments under the WTO Agreements or the Accession Protocol to review the implementation by China of the covered agreements and provisions of the Protocol, within one year of China's accession.99 The General
Council shall also review China's implementation within one year of accession.100 This annual review of China's implementation progress and status
will take place after accession each year for eight years, and then there will
be a final review in the tenth year or at an earlier date decided by the General Council. 0 1
Under this transitional review mechanism, China shall provide relevant
information specified in Annex 1A to the Accession Protocol to each subsidiary body in advance of the review. After review, each body shall
promptly report the results to the relevant Council or the General Council if
applicable. 0 2 The information required by Annex 1A is wide enough to
cover virtually all important aspects of China's economy and trade policies
and practices. It includes the economic data, economic policies, framework
for making and enforcing policies, policies affecting trade in goods, policies
affecting trade in services, TRIP regime, and any specific questions in the
context of the transitional review mechanism (received by the03General
Council or relevant subsidiary bodies from other Members).
regime; trade policies and practices by measure; trade policy and practices by sector; trade
disputes and consultations.
7 TPRM, supra note 3, at C(vi).
98 These bodies include Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Council for Trade in Services, Committees on Balance-ofPayments Restrictions, Market Access, Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Technical Barriers to Trade, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Anti-Dumping Measures, Customs Valuation, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Safeguards, Trade in Financial Services. The list covers almost all WTO bodies.
99 Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 art. 18(1).
"' Id. at art. 18(2).
...
Id. at art. 18(4).
102
03

1

Id. at art. 18(1).
Id. at Annex IA.
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The annual review by the General Council is to be conducted in accordance with the framework set out in Annex lB and in the light of the results
of any review held by subsidiary bodies. According to Annex IB, the General Council will review the reports and the issues by each subsidiary, the
development of China's trade with WTO Members and other trading partners (including the volume, direction and composition of trade), and recent
developments and cross-sectoral issues regarding China's trade regime.
China is obliged to submit any information and the documentation relating
to the review no later than 30 days prior to the date of review.'0 4 "The General Council may
make recommendations to China and to other Members in
10 5
these respects.,
This unprecedented review mechanism has some special features.
First, the scope of review and the WTO bodies involved are much wider
than the regular committee reviews and the TPRM as aforementioned. It
involves sixteen subsidiary bodies of the WTO, each in charge of China's
commitments in the area of that body's mandate. The General Council will
have a review on the basis of these individual reviews. From this perspective, China is subject to a consolidated reviewing framework, incorporating
the monitoring and supervision from all aspects of the WTO Agreements.
In contrast, the TPRM is conducted by the TPRB, neither involving so
many subsidiary bodies nor a higher level of the comprehensive review by
the General Council. Second, this review would be more intrusive in the
sense that it aims to evaluate not only the general economic and trade policies, but also the specific progress of implementing the WTO Agreements
(for example, the progress in withdrawing or amending inconsistent legislations, the situation of accepting certain rules, etc.). The latter contents are
beyond the normal scope of TPRM. In this regard, it is fair to say that the
transitional review mechanism is toward an 'implementation status' review,
rather than a mere 'trade policy' or broad 'economic policy' review. Third,
this review supplements the normal committee reviews and the TPRM
rather than supplanting them. Given its rank in the current international
trading system, China will be subject to a TPRM every four years.1" 6 In addition, involved subsidiary bodies will also carry out regular reviews. Of
course, considering that China's provision of information on an annual basis is quite frequent, their reviews under the transitional mechanism may to
a large degree satisfy the function of regular review.
The design of a transitional review mechanism for China illustrates the
deep concerns of the WTO and other Members regarding China's capacity
and intention to implement its widespread commitments. This is partly

104Id

at Annex lB.

115Id. at art. 18(2).
106NICHOLAS

R. LARDY,

INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

104 (2002).
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owed to the fact that China has a somewhat special 'socialist market economy' system, with certain distinct characteristics not found in the normal
market economy. For example, the state interference or influence into the
economy and the enterprise operation (especially those state-owned enterprises) is still strong and may exist for quite a long period. Some market
elements, e.g., foreign exchange rate, land, labor and financing, are still
immature or distorted by government policies. Further, the one-party system may not provide the correct checks and balances to ensure that China
honors its commitments to the WTO. Therefore, the transitional review
mechanism is put in place to impose a stronger monitoring and supervision
on China's implementation of the WTO Agreements.
The operation of this special review mechanism will be a challenge not
only to China but to the WTO itself. China is under stringent reviews by
the WTO and other Members, and the annual review process would be an
administrative challenge requiring the tremendous amount of information
and documentation to be provided to the relevant WTO bodies. More significantly, China is now under a spotlight for the progress and steps of implementing the WTO commitments, and has an obligation to report to the
WTO. The international pressure created by the review mechanism may
induce China to act in line with the WTO Agreements and its commitments.
On the other hand, the WTO assumes the annual review task, also increasing its administrative burdens. Whether and how the WTO can function
well in this new mechanism may be important to its credibility and reliability as an international institution. It is interesting to see whether other
countries with backgrounds similar to China, such as Russia and Vietnam,
will be subject to this special mechanism upon their accession to the WTO.
C. Consultation
Consultation is a negotiation between parties aiming to settle the issues
concerned. With an informal character, it is a flexible instrument of implementation that is extremely suitable when States are reluctant to relinquish sovereign powers. 0 7 There is no obligation to reach the agreement
after consultation, but the existence of this procedure provides a channel for
one party to supervise the behaviors of another party and to seek an explanation, to persuade another party to keep in line with specified principles
and rules, or to find out an acceptable solution for potential disputes. In this
respect, the consultation will also facilitate the enforcement of rules and
serve the function of correcting non-compliance. When the consultation
procedure is mandatory before performing one kind of behavior or triggering formal dispute settlement procedures, its deterrence and correction

107 Van

Hoof& de Vey Mestdagh, supra note 29, at 195.
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functions will be further strengthened.
Within the WTO framework, there are two types of consultation: noncontentious consultation and contentious consultation. Contentious consultation refers to the mandatory consultation procedure within the dispute settlement system, as prescribed by the DSU, which must be carried out
between the complaining party and the respondent before the complaining
party can request to establish the panel to hear the case. Non-contentious
consultation, in contrast, refers to all other consultations which are not a
pre-condition of entering into the dispute settlement procedure, although the
failure to reach agreement may cause the complaining party to initiate the
contentious consultation later.'l 8
1. Non-contentious Consultation
Article XXII: 1 of GATT 1994 is the basic provision on the noncontentious consultation with a general character. It says that each Member
"shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by
another [Member] with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this
Agreement". Article XXII:2 further authorizes the WTO, upon request of a
Member, to consult with any Member in respect to any matter for which it
is not possible to find a satisfactory solution through the mutual consultation under Article XXII: 1.109 The consultation procedure, either as mutual
between two Members or between one Member and the WTO acting on behalf of another Member, serves the function of the WTO as a forum among
its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations." 10 More specifically, the various WTO committees will act as the forum for consultations
in relation to the operation and objectives of the relevant agreement.
There are at least three types of non-contentious consultation dealing
with the subject matter: the existence of one Member's behavior; the prospective actions of one Member; and the coordination of Members' behavior. The first type relates to the negotiation between two Members
concerning the existence of a trade-related behavior of one party. It is a
108 Some scholars hold that consultations under Article XXIII: I are the first step in dispute proceedings. See MCGOVERN, supra note 73, at 2.231. However, this view only focuses on the contentious nature of the consultations as the first step of dispute resolution, but
ignores other functions of consultation not directly relating to the disputes. From a point of
dispute proceedings, any consultation that occurred before the proceedings but failed to
achieve the agreements can be said to be the first step of dispute proceedings, if such proceedings are finally triggered.
109 One example is the restrictions on balance-of-payment. When the adversely affected
Member and the Member imposing the restrictions fail to have a fruitful mutual consultation,
the first Member can request the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions to step in
to the consultation. GATT 1994 art. XII.
110 Final Act, supra note 1, at art. 111:2.
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kind of post-consultation. For example, where a Member is not being accorded the concession in its schedule because of a ruling under the domestic
law of another Member with respect to the classification of a product, the
Members involved, together with other Members substantially interested,
shall enter into negotiations for compulsory adjustment."'
The second type is in essence a kind of prior consultation before one
Member can adopt certain actions affecting another Member. This is a
strong form of supervision in the implementation framework, because it allows other Members to interfere in an early stage based on the evaluation of
one Member's prospective actions. For example, one Member shall consult
other Members whose products are the subject of investigation before the
initiation of a countervailing duty investigation, aiming to arrive a mutually
agreed-upon solution.' 12 For the restrictions for economic development
purposes, where the restrictions relate to products that are the subject of
concession in one Member's schedule of concessions, that Member is to
consult with other Member(s) with which the concession was initially negotiated, or any other Members substantially interested." 13 Under the Agreement on Safeguard, the Member contemplating to initiate a safeguard
measure shall provide adequate opportunities for the prior consultation with
other Members having substantial interest in the export of any related product.114

The third relates to the coordination of certain trade-related behaviors
between two Members and is in most cases a 'best-endeavor' process. For
example, Members are encouraged to enter into consultation with a view to
entering into bilateral or multilateral arrangements on the recognition of
equivalent sanitary and phytosanitary measures." 5
Notably, there is no absolute borderline between the non-contentious
and the contentious consultations, especially for the first and second types
of the non-contentious consultations. When the Member initiating the consultation has a view that the subject matter under consultation would be in
violation of the WTO Agreements, it can also choose to start the contentious consultation procedure under the DSU directly. When the Member is
invited to be consulted in advance, the failure of achieving agreements may
urge it to start the dispute settlement procedure immediately after the adoption of that action by another Member.

"'GATT

1994, supra note 55, at art. 11:5.

:2SCMAgreement, supra note 70, at art. 13.
"3 GATT 1994, supra note 55, at art. XVIII.
114 Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 86, art. 12.3.
115 SPMAgreement, supra note 61, at art. 4.
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2. Contentious consultation

The consultation requirement in the DSU is a fundamental component
of the WTO dispute settlement system. This process is essentially a political one, aimed at producing a mutually agreed-upon solution consistent
with the WTO rules."t 6 Its basic purpose as set out in the DSU is to encourage Members to "obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter".' 17 This accommodates the overall goal of WTO dispute settlement procedure. Article
3.7 of the DSU states: "[T]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanisms is
to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to
the parties to a dispute and consistent with the [WTO] Agreements is
clearly to be preferred."
The WTO dispute settlement procedure starts when a Member formally
requests the consultation of another Member. The consultation request
must be in writing, it must identify the measures of the other Member that
are being challenged, and provide "an indication of the legal basis for the
complaint" (i.e., the provisions of the substantive WTO Agreements that the
other Member has allegedly violated)." 8 The requests of consultation shall
be notified to the DSB and the relevant WTO Councils and Committees by
the complaining party.1 9 Unless otherwise agreed, a reply to the consultation request must be made within 10 days, and the consultations should begin within 30 days of the receipt of the request. Failing to do this will
entitle the complaining party to proceed directly to the establishment of a
panel.' 20 When the consultation begins, it shall be held in confidence and
without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceeding.'21
During the process of consultation, the Members can voluntarily use three
other mechanisms
to solve the disputes: good offices, conciliation, and me22
diation. 1
If consultation fails to settle a dispute within 60 days of being requested (or earlier if agreed), the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.1 23 It is estimated that the minimally required
consultation period would be 71 days, the minimum period of 60 days for
consultations plus the advance notice for the DSB meetings to establish the

116William J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful PoliticalAspects
and Avoiding "Over-Legalization," in NEW DIRECTION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

292-93 (M. Bronckers & R. Quick eds., 2000).
17 DSU, supra note 44, at art. 4.5.
18 1d. at art. 4.4.
d19Id.

120

Id. at art. 4.3.

121DSU, supra note 44, at art. 4.6.
'22 Id. at art. 5.
123Id.

at art. 4.7.
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panel. 124 Since the consultation is confined to the parties, the complaining
party need not show that the issue referred for consultations was actually
discussed in depth, but only that they took place, or were at least
requested,
25
and that 60 days elapsed before the panel request was made.'
It is clear that the intention of this consultation procedure is to promote
and enhance the resolution of disputes without the need for establishing a
panel, i.e., a filtering effect. As of January 1, 2002, 242 requests for consultation have been made, and 128 out of the total 242 cases have been settled,
within which 70 cases were resolved by the DSB rulings and recommendations, 39 cases were settled bilaterally and 19 cases were concluded in other
ways (such as amendment or expiration of the measures in dispute, withdrawal of the complaints, settlement through inaction, or a new request for
consultations superseding the former matter). 126 None of the disputes was
resolved by diplomatic means of settlement such as good office, conciliation or mediation under Article 5 of DSU. Therefore, the rate of bilateral
settlement is around 30 percent of the total settled cases. In this regard, it is
fair to say that the WTO is quite successful in resolving disputes without resorting to a Panel. Since the DSU contemplates that parties, by mutual
agreement, may desire to continue the consultation after the expiration of
the 60-day period, the actual period of consultation would be much longer.
For example, it is observed that most disputes resolved through the consultation process before 2000 appeared to be settled within a five-to-fifteen
month period subsequent to the initial notification of the dispute, while only
two of the disputes were settled within the 60-day period.127 On the one
hand, this tendency shows the possible delays of the consultation process;
on the other hand, it also suggests that the involved Members may mutually
accept such a delay as a way to avoid the formal panel procedures, reflecting the diplomatic nature of the consultation and the political aspect of the
DSU.
While recognizing that the consultation procedure does serve the filtering effect and function to solve disputes bilaterally, it should have an objective assessment of its status in the implementation mechanisms. There are
some doubts about the efficacy and utility of this procedure. In some cases,

124 Davey, supranote 116, at 293-94.

25Reports of Panel on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
Distribution of Bananas ("the Banana case"), WT/DS27/ECU, WT/DS27/GTM,
WT/DS27/HND, WT/DS27/MEX, 7.19 (Sept. 9, 1997); Report of panel on Korea - taxes
on alcoholic beverages, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R, 10.19 (Sept. 17, 1998).
126Young Duk Park & Marion Panizzon, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2001: A StatisticalAnalysis, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 221, 227-29 (2002).
127 Olin L. Wethington, Commentary on the Consultation Mechanism under the WTO
Dispute Settlement UnderstandingDuring its First Five Years, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.

583, 585 (2000).
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the respondent does not negotiate in good faith, especially when the prospects of resolving the disputes by a panel are inevitable.' 28 Under this circumstance, the consultation is in effect a tactic of delay. It is partly because
in most cases, the dispute settlement procedure is invoked after extensive
effort to resolve differences outside the WTO context, so the entry into consultation is merely a procedure before reaching a panel decision. 129 Generally speaking, consultations will encourage the resolution of disputes in the
relatively straightforward cases, in the absence of overwhelming domestic
political pressures. 130 Even for those settled, the consultation itself is only a
procedure to bring the parties to the table for serious negotiations and acts
as one of the factors leading to the settlement, rather than as the single contribution to the resolution.
D. Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU govern the implementation of the DSB
recommendations and rulings against the losing party. It recognizes that
"prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
32
Members."' 13 1 The DSU establishes three implementation procedures.
The first are the procedures and guidelines for establishing a compliance
deadline, or "reasonable period of time" for coming into compliance. The
second are the 'compliance review' procedures to be used when there is a
disagreement over whether the losing party had complied with the recommendations and rulings. The third are the procedures for the suspension of
concessions if the losing party fails to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings or otherwise satisfy the winning party by its implementation deadline. Under these procedures, the DSB recommendations and
rulings can be implemented in three ways: (1) withdrawal of the WTO inconsistent measures ("withdrawal"), achieved by the losing party's changing laws, regulations and/or practices; (2) compensation to the winning
party; and (3) retaliation authorized by the DSB if the losing party fails to
comply and refuses to pay compensation.

128For example, the EC argued in the Bananas III case that the consultations in that case
did not serve the purpose for which they were intended. It is clear that this case could only
be resolved after a panel ruled whether the discriminatory aspects were WTO-consistent or
not. The Banana case, WT/DS27/ECU, T 7.18 (May 22, 1997).
29 Wethington, supra note 127, at 588.
30 Id. at 586.
'1DSU, supra note 44, at art. 21.1.
32 Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementa-

tion Procedures:A System in Need of Reform, 3 1 LAW & POL'Y

INT'L Bus.

709, 713 (2000).
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1. The implementation process
There are three phases for the implementation process under the DSU:
the acceptance of the implementation plan, the monitoring of the implementation, and the compensation/retaliation.
(a) Acceptance of the implementation plan
If the final report finds that a Member has acted inconsistently with its
WTO obligations, or nullifies or impairs benefits accrued to other Members, Article 21.3 requires that the Member notify the DSB of its plan for
implementing the DSB recommendations and rulings at a DSB meeting
held within 30 days after the report is adopted. If it is "impractical to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings," the Member shall
have a "reasonable period of time" to do so.133
There are three alternative methods to determine a "reasonable period
of time." The first option, under Article 21.3(a), is "the period of time proposed by the Member concerned provided that such period is approved by
the DSB," that is, the time period acceptable to the winning party and all
other DSB Members. Second, "in the absence of such approval," Article
21.3(b) provides that a "reasonable period of time" is "a period of time
agreed by the parties to the dispute within forty-five days" after the date of
adoption of the final report. Finally, "in the absence of such agreement,"
Article 21.3(c) provides that "a reasonable period of time" will be "determined through binding arbitration within ninety days" after the date of
adoption of the final report. It further provides that "[a] guideline for the
arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time ...
should not exceed
15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.
However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular
circumstances" (emphasis added).
Consequently, the disputed issues are usually how long such a reasonable period of time should be and what kinds of "particular circumstances"
the arbitrator should take into account.
In early arbitrations, the arbitrators acted as though there was a presumption in favor of the 15-month period.134 However, the EC-Hormones
case marks the end of the 15-month guideline model, and introduces the
"immediate compliance" model. In the award, the reasonable period of
time was authoritatively defined as "the shortest period possible within the
legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB."' 35 Arbitrators draw a line between legislative and administraDSU, supra note 44, at art. 21.3.
supra note 73, at 2.24.
135Report of arbitration on EC measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones),
133

34 McGOVERN,

WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13,
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tion actions taken by the losing party to implement the recommendations
and rulings. The Canada- Patent award held:
[I]f implementation is by administrative means, such as through a regulation,
then the 'reasonable period of time' will normally be shorter than for implementation through legislative means. It seems reasonable to assume, unless
proven otherwise due to unusual circumstances in a given case, that regulations
can be changed more quickly than statutes. To be sure, the administrative
process 36can sometimes be long; but the legislative process can oftentimes be
longer.'

Nowadays, a losing party usually has 8 months for administrative implementing measures or 12 months for a legislative action. 137 However, the 3 8
losing party is not obliged to use an extraordinarily legislative procedure,
although it is expected to take the flexibility in such procedures. 39 The
choice and timing of the detailed operating steps in enacting a new law are
properly left to the party itself.
Once the losing party chooses the implementing means, the debate focuses on the "particular circumstances" upon which the reasonable period
of time may be shorter or longer. Arbitrators have accepted the delays
caused by the complexity of a Member's rule-making processes, 40 by the
procedures that officials must normally follow even if they are not legally

binding (e.g., administrative guidelines),'

41

and by the developing country

status and the disastrous economic and financial situations. 142 They refused
to consider the factors such as the controversial nature of the measure, 143 the
political party balance in parliament, 144 the summer vacation 45 or the need

136

Report of arbitration on Canada-patent protection of pharmaceutical products,

WT/DS 114/13, 49 (Mar. 17, 2000).
137 Pierre Monnier, The Time to Comply with an Adverse WTO Ruling: Promptness within
Reason, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 825, 831 (2001).
138 Report of panel on Korea-taxes on alcoholic beverages, supra note 125 (June 4,
1999).
13 See Report of arbitration on United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/12, 39 (Jan 15, 2001).
140 See, e.g., Report of arbitration on EC-regime for the importation, sale, and distribution of bananas, WT/DS27/15, 19 (Jan. 7, 1998); see also Report of arbitration on EC, supra note 135, at 47.
41Report of arbitration on Canada, supra note 136, at 41.
42 Report of arbitration on Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12, 24 (Dec. 7, 1998).
14Report of arbitration on United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/12, 41 (Jan. 15, 2001).
60 (Feb.
144 Report of arbitration on Canada-term of patent protection, WT/DS 170/10,
28, 2001).
145 Report of arbitration on Canada-patent protection of pharmaceutical products,
WT/DS114/13, 61 (Aug. 18, 2000).
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for structural adjustment. 46 To generalize, the arbitrators tend to take into
account the complexity of the domestic legislative or regulatory system, the
constraints on the speed and flexibility of legislators and administrative officials, and occasionally, the special consideration to developing countries
(especially which are in the deep economic recession).
(b) Monitoring the implementation
The second phrase is the monitoring during the implementation period
as determined in the first phrase. The winning party has two principal ways
to compel a losing party's compliance with the final report.
First, Article 21.5 provides:
[W]here there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendationsand rulings

such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement
procedures,including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel
shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to
it (emphasis added).
In other words, if the losing party at any point during the implementation
period takes an action that it claims to be in compliance with the recommendations and rulings, and the winning party disagrees, the winning party
can request a ninety-day review by a panel for the WTO consistency of
such actions. The arbitration can even be requested before the expiration of
the reasonable period if the measures are sufficiently certain to permit arbitration. Further, the purpose of Article 21.5 is to review the compliance by
the losing party, including its actions and no-actions, so the phrase "measures taken" needs to be read as 'measures taken or should be taken." Otherwise, a mere no-action by the losing party will never create a measure, so
there is no chance to initiate the Article 21.5 compliance review because
there is no 'existence' of such a measure at all. The Appellate Body has
clarified that the "measures" means the measures which have been, or
which should be, adopted by a Member to bring about compliance with the
47
recommendations and rulings. 1
However, there are two critical issues in relation to the operation of
this "compliance review" arbitration procedure. First, suppose the losing
party refuses to take any action to withdraw its inconsistent measures or
bring them in compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings during the implementation period. Could the winning party directly request the

146

See, e.g., id at 52.

147
Report of Appellate Body on Canada-measures affecting the export of civilian air-

craft-recourse by Brazil to DSU Article 21.5, WT/DS70/AB/RW,
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arbitration before the expiration of the implementation period, or must it
wait until the expiration of that period? This situation occurred in the ECBananas case. In this case, EC's import regime for bananas was held to be
inconsistent with the WTO Agreements in a number of aspects. Six months
before its reasonable period expired, the EC approved the "reforms," which
were viewed by the winning parties as still WTO-inconsistent and had been
strongly opposed during the process of its proposal and adoption. 48 The
U.S. proposed to have an Article 21.5 compliance review immediately by
the original panel, but the EC rejected this request for several months, insisting that such a review could not be undertaken until the EC's reasonable
period had fully expired. 49 From the text of Article 21.5, in order to decide
whether there is an existence or non-existence of the compliance measures
by the losing party, the winning party does have to wait until the expiration
of the implementation period, because theoretically it is possible for the losing party to implement the recommendations and rulings on the last day of
the implementation period. But from another view, Article 21.5 may be
merely a tool for buying several months of additional time by the losing
party to evade its obligations.
Secondly, should Article 21.5 require the winning party to follow normal WTO dispute settlement procedures in order to challenge the new
measures (i.e., consultations, request for a panel, a ninety-day panel review,
an Appellate Body review, and another reasonable period)? Again, the EC
raised this argument in the EC-Bananascase. The root for this issue is the
ambiguities in the phrase 'these dispute settlement procedures' of Article
21.5, without a precise definition. In the EC-Bananas case, the EC acknowledged that the reasonable period of time can only be used once: if the
implementing measures are found in the Article 21.5 proceeding to be illegal as well, the other party can proceed to a request for retaliation and need
not await any further Article 21.5 proceedings to assess any possible new
implementing measures taken after the end of the reasonable period of
time.150 Although such an argument emerges less frequently in subsequent
Article 21.5 compliance reviews, it is necessary to clarify whether these reviews should be less than normal dispute settlement procedures
when the
5
Members are negotiating the amendment of the DSU.' '
The second way of implementation is the DSB's ongoing surveillance.
Article 21.6 provides that "the DSB shall keep under surveillance the im148 Gleason and Walther, supra note 132, at 720-24.
141Id. at 723.

150Allan Rosas, Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings:

An EU Perspective,4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 131, 142 (2001).
15'
This point has already been addressed in the Draft Decision Regarding the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/MIN(99) (Dec.
2, 1999).
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plementation of adopted recommendations or rulings." Further, the winning party can raise the issue of implementation at any time following their
adoption. Unless otherwise decided by the DSB, the issue of implementation shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time and shall
remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved. During this process, the losing party is required to submit a "status report" in writing of its
52
implementation progress ten days before each such meeting of the DSB. 1
This mechanism aims to impose a public pressure and shame on the losing
party, urging its prompt implementation. However, there are no detailed
requirements on the manner and the contents of the status report, and the
losing party can simply report that "significant progress" has been made
and then satisfy the Article 21.6 reporting. When an issue sensitive to domestic politics is concerned, it is not unusual that the government of a losing party will ignore the international pressure in return for the domestic
support.
(c) Compensation/Retaliation
Article 22.2 provides that if the losing party does not implement the
recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time, the winning party may seek compensation. The losing party shall enter into consultations "with a review to developing mutually acceptable compensation."
If no acceptable compensation has been agreed within twenty days after the
expiration of the reasonable period of time, the winning party may "request
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements." 153 In accordance with Article 22.4 and 22.6, within thirty days of
the end of the reasonable period, the DSB is required to authorize the retaliation if the parties have not agreed to compensation, equivalent to the
level of the nullification or impairment. Under Article 22.3, the winning
party should first seek the suspension with respect to the same sector(s) in
which the final report has found the breach by the losing party (the samesector retaliation); if it considers tie same-sector retaliation not practicable
or effective, the retaliation may be aimed at other sector(s) under the same
agreement (the cross-sectoral retaliation); if it considers the cross-sectoral
retaliation not practicable or effective and the circumstances are serious
enough, the retaliation may be aimed at other agreements (the crossagreement retaliation). The retaliation should be temporary in nature, and
shall only be applied until such time as the WTO-inconsistent measure has

52 DSU,

supra note 44, at art. 21.6.

"5Id. at art. 22.2.
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been withdrawn, or the satisfactory54 solution has been provided by the losing
party or been achieved mutually.'
There are only two exceptions to this mandatory DSB-authorized retaliation. First, the DSB may decide by consensus to reject the request of
retaliation by the winning party, which is unlikely in practice. Second, an
Article 22.6 arbitration is initiated by the losing party. If the losing party
"objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles
and procedures [of suspension under Article 22.3] have not been followed,"
the matter should be arbitrated by the original panel (if members are available) or by an arbitrator. 55 The arbitration shall be completed within 60
days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. 56 The arbitrator is mandated to determine whether the level of the suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment and whether the proposed suspension is allowed under the covered agreement, as well as the
claims that the winning party's proposed retaliation does not follow the
principles and procedures of Article 22.3.157 Upon issuance of the arbitrator's decision, the DSB, upon58request, must authorize the retaliation consistent with that final decision.
One key issue is that there is a potential conflict between Articles 21.5
and 22. Article 21.5 sets out the compliance review on the existence and
consistence of the measures taken by the losing party for implementation.
Article 22 provides that the winning party can request the DS13 to authorize
the retaliation if the losing party fails to implement the recommendations
and rulings before the expiration of the implementation period. However,
should the Article 22 authorization be conditional on the findings of the Article 21.5 compliance review (in other words, only after the Article 21.5 review finds that the implementation measures are not satisfactory can the
winning party request the DSB authorization), or initiated automatically
once the implementation period expires (that is, irrespective of whether
there exists the Article 21.5 review or such a review is still pending)?
There is no clear sequence of these two procedures in the DSU, and again,
59
such an ambiguity was fully argued by the EC in the EC-Bananascase. 1
Common sense suggests that the panel must make a finding of noncompliance before a party can seek authorization to retaliate for failure to
comply, otherwise it would be a kind of unilateral decision by the winning
party on the losing party's implementation status, rather than with recourse

156

SId. at art. 22.8.
SId. at art. 22.6.

Id. at art. 22.6. In practice, Article 22.6 arbitration often exceeds the 60-day period.

57 DSU, supra note 44, at art. 22.7.
158 Id. at art. 22.7.
159 In the Bananas case, the EC eventually required an Article 22 arbitration on the level
of the US's proposed suspension of concessions.
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to the WTO dispute settlement procedures as required under Article 23 of
the DSU. However, the sequencing conflict between Articles 21.5 and 22
cannot be solved unless the DSU is amended by Members to address this
issue.160 In practice, the parties to disputes have adopted the approach of bilateral agreements to clarify the sequencing of proceedings under these two
of the Article 21.5 comarticles, most of which require awaiting the result
1 61
retaliation.
of
request
the
before
review
pliance
2. Evaluating the effectiveness of the implementationprocess
To evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation process, two criteria are the most important: speed and completeness.
There is a relatively clear timetable for each phrase of the implementation process. In general, the time from the initiating of dispute settlement
procedures to the implementation of the final report may be in the area of 23 years. For the implementation process, the maximum time-frame from
the adoption of the final report to the retaliation authorized by the DSB
would be about 24 to 25 months, and the average time in practice would
range from 12 to 16 months. Such a waiting period itself is not a problem,
because all Members agree and accept it under the WTO Agreements.
However, the problem is that the existing system provides the losing party a
chance to exploit the procedures to their fullest extent and thus may create
an undesirably long timetable for the injured party. The usual delay tactics
may include the Article 21.3 arbitration for the reasonable period of time,
the Article 21.5 compliance review and the Article 22.6 arbitration on suspension. By using these procedures, the losing party can at least earn about
six more months before it actually implements the recommendations and
rulings.
The current DSU system has in effect some incentives for the losing
party to try delaying the implementation of recommendations and rulings,
especially for those which may arouse strong domestic resistance. Besides
the employment of the ambiguities and drafting oversights of the DSU and
the full-extent use of all available delay tactics, one fundamental feature of
the WTO enforcement mechanism-the lack of reparative damages-acts
as the most significant incentive to the delay. As mentioned above, the
DSU prefers the withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measures, which can
occur only before the expiration of the reasonable period. When the with-

160 On January 25, 1999, the General Council referred this matter to the DSB to be dealt

with in the context of the scheduled DSU Review. No consensus was reached for amendment to the DSU, so this matter has not been fully resolved. EC - Authoritative Interpretation under Article IX:2 WTO Agreement, WT/GC/W. 133 (Jan. 25, 1999).
161 For details, see S. A. Rhodes, The Article 21.5/22 Problem: ClarificationThrough BilateralAgreements,3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 553, 555-56 (2000).
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drawal is not achieved, two parties concerned can negotiate for compensation. Only if the negotiation of compensation does not work or the winning
party gives up such a negotiation chance will the suspension of concessions
62
be authorized by the DSB-even so, it is still in a temporary nature.1
Therefore, the remedies under the WTO system are prospective and forward-looking (that is, the losing party commits to withdraw the inconsistent
measure and avoid causingfuture injury), rather than retrospective (that is,
the losing party shall commit to avoid future injury and also to be liable to
compensate past injuries). As the EC expressed unequivocally its view in
one case, which has been broadly agreed with by US and other countries:
The absence of remedy for past and consummated violations is a well-known
feature of the GATT/WTO system. First, it is inherent in the principle that
DSB rulings do not have retroactive effect. Second, it is established and accepted that it can lead in some cases to there being no remedy at all for the
complaining party. 163
In other words, the losing party takes no liability of compensation for introducing a WTO-inconsistent measure, and at least can maintain such a
measure before and during the panel procedures and until the expiration of
the implementation period. For the winning party, the damages to its affected industries before the withdrawal of this measure-which is the most
ideal outcome of the enforcement mechanism-cannot be compensated.
Therefore, in an extreme case, it is fully available for one Member to introduce a WTO-inconsistent measure, even intentionally, in order to serve
some most urgent needs (e.g., subject to the domestic political pressures),
and then wait to be challenged by another Member and withdraw it after the
adverse finding of the final report-still in a good reputation of implementing the WTO rulings in time.
The second criterion is the completeness of the implementation of recommendations and rulings. The withdrawal of the inconsistent measure is
the primary objective of the implementation, and the DSU provides various
mechanisms to monitor and enforce this objective. However, there is a
fundamental problem: what if the losing party refuses the withdrawal? Under such a scenario, can the losing party pay compensation to the winning
party or even accept the retaliation in return for the maintenance of such
measure? Is there any further mechanism to redress this situation? Even
this problem may not arise to the full extent in practice; the answers will reveal the nature of the dispute settlement procedures as well as the ultimate
effectiveness of the implementation process.
62
163

DSU, supra note 44, at art. 22.8.
Report on United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the European

Communities, WT/DS165/R,

5.12 (July 17, 2000).
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The provisions of DSU stipulate that the compensation and the suspension of concessions shall be "temporary" and only be applied until the losing party fully implements the recommendations and rulings. 164 However,
the term "temporary" is not defined, so it could be a considerable period of
time. The reason for refusing the compensation as a replacement of the
withdrawal of inconsistent measures is to prevent the losing party from
seeking the "purchase of impunity" through compensation, which would
otherwise create a system where Members with sufficient financial resources would have been able to maintain inconsistent measures indefinitely, thus putting less resourceful Members at a disadvantage.1 65
Similarly, the authorization of retaliation for small developing countries
against giant developed countries (e.g., US and EU) may not have the practical effect, because of the political and broader economic considerations.
Therefore, allowing the retaliation as a substitute to the withdrawal of inconsistent measures would result in a double jeopardy to the weaker Members in international economy: the WTO-inconsistent measures of the losing
party still exists, but the winning party may not be able to actually carry out
the retaliation or even to find enough imports from the losing party for the
suspension of concessions.
Although the DSU texts clearly demonstrate the priority and the expectation of compliance, it does not stipulate the consequences for the losing
party's refusal of the full implementation, which shows the DSU's deliberate silence on this point. Therefore, if the losing party chooses to negotiate
compensation, or if the negotiation fails to accept the retaliation, there is no
prohibition in the DSU. The DSU enforcement mechanism has been exhausted, and there is no supplementary mechanism available to the winning
party to enforce the recommendations and rulings instead. The losing party
will still be subject to the DSB surveillance and the public pressure, and of
course may change its position afterwards. However, such a change is
more likely to be caused by other factors such as political and domestic
elements. This nature has already been articulated by the U.S. and the EC.
In the U.S., the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) to the 1994
Uruguay Round Agreement Act emphasizes the ability of the Congress to
decide whether any change to US law will be made in response to a panel
decision: "if a report recommends that the United States change federal law
to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it is for the
Congress to decide whether any such change will be made."' 66 SAA further
states:
DSU, supra note 44, at art. 22.8.
Patricio Grane, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 755, 762-63 (2001).
166Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement ofAdministrative Action, H.R. 103-316,
103d Cong. 2d Sess. 1016 (1994).
64
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The DSU recognizes that it may not be possible for a government to agree to
the removal of a measure that a panel has found to be inconsistent with a Uruguay Round agreement. Accordingly, it provides for alternative resolutions,
including the provision of trade compensation and other negotiated settlements, or the suspension of benefits equivalent to the67'nullification or impairment' of benefits caused by the offending measure.'
Similarly, the European Court of Justice acknowledges in Portugalv.
Council1 68 that the compensation under Article 22.2 is of a temporary nature, but adds that,
[T]o require the judicial organs to refrain from applying the rules of domestic
law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article 22 of that memorandum
of entering
69
into negotiated arrangements even on a temporary basis.'
It strong suggests that even if the compensation (and similarly, the retaliation) is temporary, it is a full legitimate alternative to the losing party under
the DSU; when there is no time limit on the "temporary" period, these
measures with a temporary nature can virtually last an indefinite period of
time.
3. Comments
In summary, there is strong evidence in the DSU that compensation
and retaliation are only temporary measures, and compliance by withdrawal
of inconsistent measure is preferred, 170 but there is no further adverse consequence and redress mechanisms to prevent the losing party from accepting compensation and retaliation as valid options. Therefore, the
implementation process of DSB recommendations and rulings is, as I will
argue, only of a semi-legal, semi-political nature.
The existing rules of implementing the recommendations and rulings
have already shown the legal nature. On the other hand, the apparent ambiguities in some key issues represent the respect to the political wills of the
Members to choose the final form of implementation, and the aim to
achieve a political balance within the WTO system. This feature is in conformity with the general nature of political compromise in international
trade agreements. As one commentator correctly observes, which is also
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id.

16 Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. 1-8395 (1999).
69

1

Id. at 1-8437.
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For the typical academic view, see John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Un-

derstanding - Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60

(1996).
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applicable to the WTO system:
An international trade agreement will always be in the nature of a compromise

by each of the State Parties between each State's aspiration to attain the economic benefits introduced by the agreement, and each State's desire to preserve optimum sovereignty. On the one hand, every international agreement
naturally contains limitations on the freedom of action of each State and constrains the policy options open to it. On the other hand, the economic benefits
which each State wishes to attain through the trade agreement, will not be
achieved in their entirety unless there is reciprocal honouring of the obligations
contained in the agreement. The first consideration, the preservation of sovereignty and prevention of restrictions on courses of action, creates a tendency
towards preferring non-binding agreements and agreements which leave the
optimum freedom of action to the State, for example, by flexible or vague
drafting, and use of 'escape clauses' and weak enforcement procedures. Such
agreements allow flexibility in honoring obligations and retain scope for diplomatic maneuvering. 171
While the whole WTO system is a rule-oriented one, it is not an absolutely
rule-based one, or at least, not in the aspect of implementation. The dispute
resolution and implementation procedures are based on a set of legal rules,
but these rules are the product of political negotiations and compromises
among Members, which are characterized by the abstractness, ambiguities
and best-endeavour nature in a few points, so as to leave a scope of maneuverability that is enjoyed by the legislative and administrative organs of
Members. Rather, this shows the strong existence of the political nature of
the multilateral trading system, that is, its success cannot be absolutely
based on pure, self-imposed legal rules, but should take into account all factors including the different powers of each Member, the political will of the
governments of Members, the domestic acceptability of the trading system
(including the observance of a ruling imposed by a supranational body) and
the political balance among Members. One simple phrase may well generalize the reasons why Members are reluctant to have a more stringent DSU
or a more powerful DSB: "Today's complainant may be tomorrow's respondent."
IV. REFORMING THE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK OF THE WTO
AGREEMENTS

We can approach the topic of reforming the WTO implementation
framework from academic, political and institutional perspectives. From
the academicperspective, it is open to scholars to suggest proposals to

171Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicizationof InternationalTrade Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775, 775-76 (1996).
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strengthen the powers of implementation by the WTO and improve the
relevant legal rules in the WTO Agreements. From the political perspective, whether the proposals could be accepted by the Members to become a
part of multilateral trading system depends on the intention and capacity of
governments of Members, as well as the degree of domestic support. The
process of political-diplomatic compromise and trade-off among Members
will to a greater extent shape the multilateral trading system, in particular
within the sphere of negotiating and drafting its legal rules. Considering the
deep concerns from Members, especially from developing-country Members, for the balance between their sovereignty and the rule-oriented WTO
system with an increasing mandate, it is predictable that any proposals to
strengthen the WTO's implementation powers will be subject to heated debate and the final outcome would have a significant discount to the original
ones. From the institutionalperspective, the WTO has the ability to improve its system from a technical point, especially in some procedural upgrades. But this "technical" reform is also under two constraints: first,
when it amounts to an interpretation of the WTO Agreements or significantly influences the balance of rights and obligations of the Members, the
72
power will rest on the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.
Second, the increased powers of the WTO-and increased responsibilities-will require more administrative capacity and budget of the institution
to carry it out, which may also restrain the actual scope of such reforms.
This part will put more emphasis on the potential reforms available
from the political and institutional perspectives. First, it proposes that the
implementation framework of the WTO Agreements can consider incorporating some incentives for compliance, with an increasing nature of "incentive-based" compliance. Second, it discusses possible reforms in some
implementing instruments.
A. Direction of Reform: Incentive-Based Compliance
From the "implementation matrix" of Part II, it is observed that the existing implementation framework of the WTO Agreements has its focus on
assurance of compliance and correction of non-compliance through the
mechanisms of monitoring and supervision and using the basic implementing instruments such as notification, reporting, review and consultations.
There are several weak aspects: first, the facilitation of compliance by using
the capacity building mechanism has only a limited role to play, not being
incorporated into other modalities of implementation; second, the enforcement mechanism-the dispute settlement procedures-is only applied to
correct non-compliance, and plays no role in other modalities; third, the major instrument of supervision is the consultation procedures, which only
172Final Act, supra note 1, at art. IX:2.
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provides a chance of negotiation but cannot assure the outcome; fourth,
there is very limited role of supervision from the WTO in the form of prior
consultation or prior consent. Comparatively, the monitoring mechanism
plays the best function, especially for the notification and reporting requirements.
Therefore, from an academic view, there are two directions for the reform. The first one is to strengthen the supervisory and enforcement functions of the WTO. More specifically, the scope of prior consultations and
consents from the WTO can be expanded so as to have a better control over
the Members' behavior in some key areas, the dispute settlement procedures may be extended to cover more "causes of actions" (for example, the
failure to perform the notification obligations), and the enforcement mechanisms should provide the retrospective reparation to the injured parties in
the form of damages or compensations. However, as mentioned above, the
political reality of the multilateral trading system will be very reluctant and
cautious to accommodate these reforms, and unless the multilateral negotiations can have some real breakthrough, such reforms will largely be confined to papers.
The second direction of reform, as I will propose, is to focus more on
the rationale of encouraging the compliance of the WTO Agreements by
Members and to build up the implementation framework as a combination
of incentive-based and obligation-based mechanisms. This direction will
accommodate the existing constraints and gain the utmost support from
Members' governments. From the point of incentive-based compliance, the
basic principle is to design a framework in which positive incentives can be
channeled and allocated to encourage the target Members to comply with
the WTO Agreements, and reform the existing mechanisms to convenient
and urge the Members to choose the compliance, rather than leading to the
stage of disputes resolution. From the point of obligation-based compliance, Members have already assumed a number of obligations to implement
the WTO Agreements under the existing framework, so the next step is to
consider whether there is room to reduce or consolidate some obligations to
facilitate the compliance without reducing the necessary level of requirements.
B. Some Proposals to Reform the Implementing Instruments
1. Technical assistance
The incentive strategy assumes that many compliance problems exist
because Members do not have the capacity to comply.1 73 The technical as173 WEISS, supra note

8, at 460.
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sistance plays the basic role in this strategy.
For the technical assistance by the WTO, it needs to establish more
concrete objectives into which the limited resources can be invested to gain
the maximum output. These objectives may include: first, to increase the
capacity and expertise of Members to understand the WTO Agreements and
to make necessary legislative and administrative adjustment of existing regime in compliance with the WTO obligations; second, to improve the ability of Members to participate into the trade negotiation and to use the WTO
dispute settlement system to protect their legal interests; third, to help educate the public for the public awareness of the WTO and the recognition of
the benefits of the multilateral trading system; and fourth, to provide assistance to institutionalize the legal and regulatory infrastructure that are basis
of the complete and effective implementation of the WTO Agreements (for
example, the legal system in conformity with the market economy, the administrative regime and procedures in harmony with the objectives of trade
liberalization, etc.).
The current technical assistance programs are mainly about the knowledge of the WTO Agreements, including how to use the dispute settlement
procedures. Within the Doha Development Agenda, it will be more useful
to engage in quality-based assistance, that is, the assistance in direct relation
to the scope of the negotiating challenges faced by the developing countries
such as the widespread negotiation topics and the tight deadline of negotiation. In the long run, the technical assistance should improve the development objectives of the Members, especially for the legal and institutional
infrastructures.
2. Notification andReview

The transparency measures of the WTO Agreements have already
served as the backbones of implementation. Since the satisfaction of the
heavy obligation of notification is a burden to most developing-country
Members, the WTO should consider whether it is possible to consolidate or
simplify some notification obligations. Further, the possibility of linking
the technical assistance and the performance of notification obligations (as
the basic Member obligations), for example, a special fund that will be used
to provide more training programs to the Members who will perform the
notification obligation, could be considered.
For the reviews, the WTO bodies in charge of reviews should be encouraged to play a more active role in providing advice and recommendations to the Members under review. It is also necessary to induce the
developing countries to participate more in the review meetings of TPRM.
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3. Consultation'

The main area of reform would be in the contentious consultations as
the first step of dispute settlement procedures. The purpose is to encourage
the bilateral settlement, so it is vital to design some procedural incentives to
encourage the settlement. The current procedure has some obvious shortcomings. For example, the consultation process requires only one meeting
of the parties, 7 5 and the 60-day period is too long for the cases that will inevitably arrive at the panel stage. Therefore, it is possible to increase the
quantity of meetings to two (as a legal requirement), and to encourage a
greater use of conciliation and mediation as a third-party aid and a diplomatic means to solve the disputes at the consultation stage.176
4. Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings
The ambiguities and conflicts in the DSU texts, such as the sequencing
between Article 21.5 and Article 22, can only be solved upon the amendment of the DSU. Whether and to what extent the implementation process
can be improved will finally be decided by the willingness of Members.
One issue worthy of consideration is the role of retrospective remedies.
The absence of the retrospective remedies under the current system, especially in the form of damages to the past wrongdoings by the losing party,
reflects the political natures of the WTO Agreements. An increase of powers of the DSB to mandate specific conduct from Members might cause
more defiance on the part of the governments that the WTO impinges to a
greater extent on their sovereignty, so to have a counter-effect on the promotion of compliance. Therefore, it seems that a full recognition of the retrospective remedies in the WTO law is unlikely in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that a limited retrospective remedy would be
acceptable by Members and provide the incentives for compliance. Two
limited reforms in this respect-to increase the retrospective effect of the
recommendations and rulings-have the feasibility under the existing system. First, it will have more incentives on the losing party to adopt the full
implementing measures, if there is a limited retrospective compensation
starting from the expiration of the reasonable period when the Article 21.5
finally holds the non-consistence of the implementing measures. This factor can be taken into account under the Article 22.6 arbitration to decide the
level of suspension. Second, the retrospective restitution in the form of re174Some Members already submitted the proposals for reforming the dispute settlement
system, including the consultation procedures. For a general summary, see C. Christopher
Parlin, Operation of Consultations,Deterrence,and Mediation, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
565, 570-71 (2000).
75 Wethington, supra note 127, at 585-86.

76Davey, supra note 116, at 295.
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fund or reimbursement may be allowed in limited agreements. For example, under the Agreement on Antidumping, the losing party which is held by
the final report to violate the WTO rules on imposing and collecting the
anti-dumping duties against the exporters from the winning party may be
required to reimburse the wrongly-levied duties. Another example might be
the Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures. In the Australia-Automobile Leather case, the panel has decided that the term "withdrawal of the subsidy" under Article 4(7)177 was not limited to a prospective
measure, but could also entail reimbursement and, therefore, constitutes a
corrective measure with retrospective effect; consequently, the full reimbursement of the export subsidy granted by Australia was necessary in order to effectively withdraw the subsidy. 178 Whether this approach can be
accepted into the WTO law depends on the attitude of the Appellate Body
when the next case comes to its jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION

The WTO Agreements establish a coherent and articulated approach to
the implementation. The four mechanisms-capacity building, monitoring,
supervision, and enforcement-consist of the key parts of the implementation framework, and serve the functions to ensure compliance and prevent
non-compliance under four distinct but interactive modalities. Apart from
the TPRM and the dispute settlement procedures that are traditionally categorized as the implementing measures, other instruments including technical assistance, notification, reporting, reviews and consultations are also
employed to achieve the objective of compliance by Members. The political nature of the multilateral trading system illustrates the reluctance of the
system to adopt radical reforms for strengthening the implementation powers, due to the difficulty of coordination and compromise among Members.
Therefore, the direction of reform in a feasible and practical sense should be
the transfer to a combination of the incentive-based and the obligationbased compliance models. The WTO should play a more active role in reforming the implementation framework in technical aspects. The Members,
who are both the makers and the observers of the rule-oriented multilateral
trading system, will have an ultimate decision on how to improve the degree of implementation of the WTO Agreements.

177

Article 4(7) provides that "if the measure in question is found to be a prohibited sub-

sidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without
delay." See Report on Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS126/RW

(2000).

78 Id. The two parties reached a solution in regard to implementation of the findings, so

there is no chance for the Appellate Body to rule on this issue.
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